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Abstract 
This paper examines the pre-exit productivity performance and asks how productivity 
affects future survival, controlling for firm size and unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Based on firm-level data in Japan for 1995–2002, we found that firms did not face 
“sudden death” but there was a “shadow of death.” Future exiting firms had lower 
performance five years before their exit. Moreover, unobserved firm heterogeneity had a 
statistically significant effect on firm survival analysis. However, we also found that the 
effects of unobserved heterogeneity were not very large and thus did not reverse the 
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1.  Introduction 
A number of studies have examined the relationship between firm performance 
and firm survival. Recent empirical studies have found that there was a “shadow of 
death” in firm performance: firms that will exit in the future have lower performance 
several years earlier. For instance, Griliches and Regev (1995) focused on total factor 
productivity (TFP) as a performance measure of Israeli firms and found that those that 
would exit in the future showed significantly less productivity in the present. This 
“shadow of death” is also found in France and Germany. Bellone, Musso, Nesta, and 
Quéré (2005) investigated the differences in profitability, size and TFP between future 
survivors and future exiting firms in France. By examining the mean differences in the 
performance indicators between two types of firms by exit year cohort, they confirmed 
that the future exiting firms had significantly lower performance than future survivors. 
Almus (2004) focused on employment growth as a firm performance measure and 
examined the difference in employment growth between survivors and exiting firms in 
Eastern and Western Germany. Based on the matching method, the study also found that 
future exiting firms presented lower annual growth rate of employment than survivors 
five years before exit. 
This paper builds upon these studies and empirically examines the effects of 
pre-exit performances of firms on firm survival, or the “shadow of death,” in greater 
detail. The paper asks how productivity affects the future survival of firms, controlling 
for their size and unobserved heterogeneity. The data used in this analysis are firm-level 
panel data in Japan for 1995–2002. Our data consist of firms in manufacturing and 
wholesale/retail trade industries, and the number of firms exceeds 2,100 annually after 
sifting the usable data. The goal of this paper is to provide stylized facts on which to 
base future theoretical and empirical work. 
The paper brings together and contributes to three streams of literature. The first 
stream is comprised of studies of the relationship between firm survival and firm 
performance, and is found in Mata and Portugal (1994), Audrestch and Mahmood 
(1995), Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003), and Görg and Strobl (2003). We extend 
these studies, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity as well as observed firm 
characteristics. Recent theoretical and empirical studies have emphasized the 
importance of (observed) firm/plant heterogeneity (e.g., Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and 
Kortum, 2003; Melitz, 2003). Besides, in the estimation of hazard models, estimated 
coefficients may be biased if unobserved firm heterogeneity exists.
1 However,  previous 
                                                        
1  See, for instance, Heckman and Singer (1984) for the discussion on the relationship between 
unobserved heterogeneity and associated biases in the hazard models.   2
studies based on hazard models did not take into account unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
To control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, this paper employs a hazard model 
developed by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and extended by Meyer (1990). 
The second stream is the theoretical literature on the relationship between 
productivity and firm dynamics and is found, for example, in Hopenhayn (1992). In this 
study, Hopenhayn (1992) assumed that a random productivity shock ϕ  followed the 
Markov process that was independent across firms. The distribution of the productivity 
for each firm was represented by the following distribution 
function: 0 ) ( '    ), | ( 1 < − t t t f f ϕ ϕ ϕ . A firm exits from the market if its profits fall below a 
certain threshold level. Since profits are assumed to depend on productivity level, the 
exit of firms also depends on their productivity levels. Note that the productivity shock 
is assumed to be strictly decreasing in the last productivity shock. This Markov process 
implies that the survival probability of a firm in year  t  will increase if the productivity 
of firm in year  1 − t  is high and vice versa for less productive firms. Gradual declines 
in productivity ultimately cause the exit of firms from the market, which implies the 
existence of the “shadow of death.” This paper investigates the empirical implication of 
Hopenhayn (1992). 
The third stream is literature that examined firm survival in Japan. The Japanese 
economy has been in long-term recession since the burst of the bubble economy in 1990. 
Accordingly, the rapid increase in bankruptcy of firms has become a serious problem. 
The number of firm bankruptcies increased from 1991 to 2000 and exceeded 19,000 in 
2001, the second highest number since the survey began in 1952 (Figure 1). Several 
studies have addressed the issue in Japan. Honjo (2000) and Kimura and Fujii (2003) 
performed survival analyses for 1986–1994 and 1994–1999, respectively. Our study is 
different from these studies in that we control for the effect of unobserved heterogeneity 
and examine the longer-term effects of firm performance on firm survival. 
 
=== Figure 1 === 
 
Section 2 presents the methodology employed in this paper. Section 3 discusses 
the data and issue of performance measurement. A presentation of econometric results 
follows in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 with a summary of the major findings. 
 
2.  Methodology 
This paper employs a Prentice–Gloeckler–Meyer hazard model. The model was 
first proposed by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and extended by Meyer (1990), which   3
is summarized as follows. Let  i T   be the length of firm  i ’s survival time (or the length 
of spell) while  i C   represents the censoring time. There are two types of firm. One exits 
from the market during the observed period and the other remains in the market until the 
end of the observed period, or is (right) censored. The discrete-time hazard function for 
firm  i (i.e., the probability that the firm i exits in interval t and  1 + t , where t 
indicates time after entry) is defined by: 
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t i λ   is a continuous-time hazard function. 
Denote ) (t zi   as a covariate that summarizes observed performances for firm 
i in year t. Suppose that unobserved heterogeneity is described as a random variable 
i α  that is independent of  ) (t zi ;  i α  follows the gamma distribution with a mean of 
one and variance 
2 σ ;
3 and the continuous-time hazard rate for firm i in time t 
takes the following proportional hazards form: 
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where ) ( 0 t λ  is the (unknown) baseline hazard andβ  is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated. Following Meyer (1990), we assume that  ) (t zi  is constant in the interval 
between  t and  1 + t . The discrete-time hazard function is thus: 
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4  The associate discrete-time survivor function is: 
                                                        
2  For the derivation of equation (3), see Technical Appendix 1. 
3  Abbring and Van den Berg (2005) found that the distribution of heterogeneity converged to a 
gamma distribution in a large class of hazard models with proportional unobserved heterogeneity 
4  For the derivation of equation (5), see Technical Appendix 1.   4
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Let  i δ  be an indicator variable that takes the value of one for a firm that exits 
from the market (i.e.,  i i C T ≤ ) and zero otherwise. Log-likelihood is obtained by 
conditioning on the unobserved  i α  and then integrating over its distribution (Meyer, 
1990). 
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The log-likelihood of a hazard rate without unobserved heterogeneity 
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The parameters to be estimated are 
2 σ  and β . The importance of unobserved 
heterogeneity is confirmed from significance level of the coefficients of 
2 σ . The 
hazard rate directly captures the probability that a firm will exit in the next time given 
that it survives until time  t. Estimated coefficients have the interpretation of the ratio 
of the hazards for one-unit change in the corresponding covariate. Thus, if performance 
contributes to the firm survival, the coefficient  β  must indicate significantly negative 
signs: 0 < β . Similarly, the “shadow of death” is examined by  β τ)' ( − t zi , where 
t   ,..., 0 = τ . If the “shadow of death” exists,  0 < β  is  expected. 
The last issue we should discuss is how to specify the baseline hazard 
function ) (t γ . There are two popular specifications. One is to specify the baseline hazard 
as the parametric Weibull specification, which includes a covariate defined as the log of 
the time-sequence variable. The other is the flexible nonparametric specification that 
includes a time-specific dummy as a covariate. A recent study by Dolton and van der 
Klaauw (1995) suggested that the flexible nonparametric specification is much more 
reliable than the parametric specification in the sense that the parametric specification 
constrains the general shape of baseline hazard function. We thus employ the 
nonparametric specification in the baseline model. The baseline model is described as 
follows:   5
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where  t D   is a dummy variable that takes value of one in  t  and zero otherwise. 
 
3.  Data and Measurement Issues 
3.1.  Data 
We use the confidential firm-level database METI (various years), which is 
widely used in entry/exit studies in Japan.
5 This survey was first conducted in 1991, 
then in 1994, and annually thereafter. The main purpose of the survey is to statistically 
capture the overall picture of Japanese corporate firms in light of their activity 
diversification, globalization, and strategies for research and development and 
information technology. The strength of the survey is its sample coverage and reliability 
of information. The survey is comprised of all firms with 50 or more employees and 
with capital of more than 30 million yen. 
The survey covers mining, manufacturing and service industries, although some 
service industries such as finance, insurance and software services are not included. The 
limitation of the survey is that some information on financial and institutional features 
such as keiretsu is not available and small firms with less than 50 workers (or with 
capital of less than 30 million yen) are excluded. 
From these surveys, we constructed a panel data set for the years from 1995 to 
2002 (hereafter referred to as the METI database). We drop from our sample firms for 
which the firm’s age (questionnaire-level year minus establishment year), total wages, 
tangible assets, value-added (sales minus purchases), or the number of workers were not 
positive or responses incomplete. The firms that disappear and reappear in the database 
are also dropped from our sample. In this paper, “entry” is defined as when firms appear 
in the database. Similarly, “death” or “exit” is when they disappear from the database. 
We focus on manufacturing, wholesale and retail industries since the number of firms in 
other industries is rather small. Firms that entered the market before 1995 are dropped 
so that the data are consistent with the model.   
Table 1 presents the exit patterns of firms, by entry year cohort. The number of 
firms exceeds 2,105 annually.
6  Although the total number of firms increased from 1995 
to 2002, a large number of firms exited. Table 1 indicates that conditional survival rate, 
                                                        
5  For instance, see Kimura and Fujii (2003), Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005), and Fukao 
and Kwon (2006). 
6  Note thus that our data on exiting firms includes firms that shrunk or diversify out manufacturing 
or wholesale/retail trade sectors. The number of firms and exits are summarized in Table A1, by 
sector.   6
which is defined as the number of firms in current year divided by those in previous 
year, is 76.2–91.6 percent, implying that about 10–25 percent of firms in each cohort 
exit from the market within one year of entry. Table 1 also shows that more than 




=== Table 1 === 
 
It is worth emphasizing the importance of broad industry coverage in the firm 
level study. In analyzing firm with multiple establishments, it is very important to cover 
both manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade. The METI database assigns a firm to the 
single three-digit industry that accounts for the largest proportion of the value of its 
sales. Indeed, firms that have both production plants and related sales branches often 
change their product mix between manufacturing (products) and wholesale/retail trade 
(services).
8 
Table 2 presents a transition matrix of industries from 1995 to 2002. Table 2 
indicates that 0.9-3.0 percent of firms changed their product mix between 
manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade during two consecutive years. Accordingly, a 
firm-level study that utilized manufacturing firms would only regard the changes in 
product mix between manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade as entry and exit. Such a 
study would thus overestimate the effects of entry and exit. Since our data cover both 
manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade, this study captures firm entry and exit 
behavior more accurately. 
 
=== Table 2 === 
 
One concern is that the determinants of exit through merger and acquisition 
(M&A) can be different from those of exit through bankruptcy.
9  The problem is that the 
METI database cannot identify the difference between these two types of M&A. If a 
number of firms with good productivity performance experienced exit through M&A, 
the survival analysis might indicate that the firms with high productivity exited from the 
                                                        
7  This result is not specific to Japan. For instance, about 70 percent of new firms exit within 10 
years in France (Bellone, Musso, Nesta, and Quéré, 2005). 
8  For the importance of diversifying firms in entry/exit, see Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) 
and Dunne, Klimek, and Roberts (2005). 
9  For the importance of economic differences between forms of exit, see Schary (1991).   7
market.
10 In order to exclude the effects of M&A on our study, we use the information 
on M&A from RECOF (2003).
11 After checking whether each death in the METI 
database is reported as an exit through M&A, we confirmed that no firms exited through 
M&A. 
 
3.2.  Measurement Issues 
3.2.1.  Productivity 
To make comparisons across firms and time-series, we employ the multilateral 
index method in computing TFP developed by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) 
and extended by Good, Nadiri, Roller, and Sickles (1983). This multilateral index uses a 
separate hypothetical firm as a reference point for each cross section of observations by 
industry and chain-links the reference points together over time in the same way as the 
conventional Theil–Törnqvist index of productivity growth. The index relies on a single 
reference point that is constructed as a hypothetical firm that has the arithmetic mean 
values of log output, log input, and input cost shares over firms in each year. Denote 
TFP for firm  ) ,..., 1 (   N i =  in year  ) ,..., 0 (   T t =  in a given sector as  it θ . Each firm’s 
output and inputs are measured relative to this reference point in each year and then the 
reference points are chain-linked over time. The TFP index for firm i in year t is 
defined as: 
() ()
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where  it y ln ,  ijt x ln , and  ijt s  are the log output, log input of factor  j , and the cost 
share of factor  j  for firm  i , respectively.  t y ln ,  jt x ln , and  jt s  are the same 
variables for the hypothetical reference firm in year  t and are equal to the arithmetic 
mean of the corresponding variable for all firms in a certain industry in the year. 
                                                        
10  McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) found that the plants exited through ownership change had higher 
than average productivity in the United States. 
11  RECOF (2003) defined exit date as the date reported in a newspaper. Since the METI database 
collects the information by each Japanese fiscal year (from April to March in Japan), this may 
possibly cause the difference of exit year between the METI database and RECOF (2003). For 
instance, a firm exit in February 2002 is regarded as an exit in 2002 by RECOF (2003) but an exit in 
2001 by the METI database. In order to avoid this problem, the firm is also regarded as having 
exited by M&A if the difference of exit year between the METI database and RECOF (2003) is just 
one year.   8
The first term of the first line in the above equation is the deviation of the firm’s 
output from the output of the reference point in the industry in year  t, and the second 
term is the cumulative change in the output reference point between year  t and the 
initial year,  0 = t . The two terms in the second line perform the same operation for 
each factor input  j   and are weighted by the average of the cost shares for firm  i and 
the reference point in year  t. Hence, the index measures the TFP of each firm in each 
year relative to that of the hypothetical firm in the initial year. Output is defined as gross 
output while inputs are capital, labor, and intermediate inputs. As for other additional 
data and their manipulation, see Technical Appendix 2. 
 
3.2.2.  Control Variable 
We use firm size as a control variable. Several empirical studies found that large 
firms are more likely to survive than small firms.
12 For instance, Dunne, Roberts, and 
Samuelson (1989) examined U.S. manufacturing plants from 1967 to 1977 and found 
that failure rates declined with size and age. Similar findings have been obtained for 
Ireland (Görg and Strobl, 2003), Japan (Kimura and Fujii, 2003), Portugal (Mata and 
Portugal, 1994), and the United Kingdom (Disney, Haskel, and Heden, 2003). In all 
these studies, firm size was measured by the number of workers. Following these 
studies, this paper measures firm size as the number of workers. 
Another possible performance indicator is profitability. Note, however, that 
profitability can be a good performance indicator only for listed firms.
13 The reason is 
as follows. First of all, the availability of financial data in the METI database is quite 
limited. Second, and more importantly, corporate tax is determined based on profits and 
is charged only when firms earn profits in Japan. Furthermore, firms must publish their 
                                                        
12  Note that there are some situations that large firms have incentives to exit faster than small firms. 
Without economies of scale, small firms might be expected to exit first. With scale economies, 
however, there emerge several situations in which large firms are more likely to exit from the market. 
This is because the smaller firm will operate at a variable cost disadvantage with respect to the larger 
firm with economies of scale. For instance, in the duopoly environment with declining demand and a 
single plant, Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) theoretically proved the existence of a unique 
subgame-perfect Cournot–Nash equilibrium where the larger firm exits first. Whinston (1988) 
further extended Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) and showed that the exit pattern became more 
complex when firms had multiple-plant operations. Thus, he concluded that it was difficult to 
generalize Ghemawat and Nalebuff's (1985) prediction. Lieberman (1990) empirically examined 
these two predictions and found that both predictions received some empirical support. Small firms 
were more likely to exit. Large multi-plant firms had higher rates of exit than single-plant firms once 
the effects of firm size hold constant. 
13  According to the National Tax Agency, the proportion of the firms in deficit was 72.5 percent in 
1999, 72.4 percent in 2000, 72.3 percent in 2001, and 73.8 percent in 2002, respectively. For more 
detail, see National Tax Agency website 
<http://www.nta.go.jp/category/toukei/menu/houjin/h15/data/04.xls>.   9
financial report only when they are listed in the Stock Exchange. Firms that are not 
listed in the Stock Exchange do not have to publish their financial reports. 
Listed firms are likely to show their profitability well since their profits directly 
affect their stock prices. On the other hand, nonlisted firms have a strong incentive to 
understate their profits since they do not have to publish financial reports and do not 
have to pay corporate tax when they do not earn profits. For this institutional reason, 
productivity can be a better performance indicator than profitability. 
In sum, the baseline model is written as follows. 




β θ β γ β τ τ γ − −
−
=
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s s i L D t z t                       ( 1 0 )  
where  τ θ − it ln  is the natural log of TFP and  τ − it L ln  is the natural log of employment 
scale. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1.  Baseline Model 
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results of the baseline model without and 
with unobserved heterogeneity, respectively.
14  In the estimation results, the productivity 
and employment differences among industries are removed when we pool firms of 
different industries since the hypothetical reference firm varies across industries and 
employment of firm is normalized by the average employment scale of its industry. 
 
=== Tables 3 and 4 === 
 
There are three messages in this table. First, unobserved firm heterogeneity 
sometimes has a significant effect on firm survival analysis. In Table 4, the estimated 
coefficients of 
2 σ   indicate positive and significant signs in four out of six models. But 
the variance is so small that the estimated coefficients of the model with unobserved 
heterogeneity are almost the same as those in the model without unobserved 
heterogeneity. The results imply that the effects of unobserved heterogeneity exist but 
are not large enough to reverse the conclusions. 
Second, we can confirm the “shadow of death” effect. The significantly negative 
coefficients of  τ θ − it ln  are observed from  1 = τ  to  5 = τ . Although the coefficients 
become small as the lag length increases, the coefficients of productivity are 
significantly negative five years before exit. The results mean that future exiting firms 
                                                        
14  Estimation is performed in Stata 8.2, using the pgmhaz8 command (Stata module to estimate 
discrete time (grouped data) proportional hazards models by Stephen P. Jenkins, September 2004).   10
present significantly lower productivity five years before exit. 
Third, firm size is also an important factor for firm survival. Most of the 
coefficients of firm size indicate negative signs. The results imply that large firms are 
more likely to survive, which is consistent with the findings for US firms by Dunne, 
Roberts, and Samuelson (1989). Firm size as well as productivity is a good indicator for 
the future survival of firms. 
Note that our definition of t is not necessarily the same as time following 
establishment, or firm age, because of the threshold of the survey. Several studies have 
found that young firms are more likely to exit from the market (i.e., Dunne, Roberts, 
and Samuelson, 1988). Some of these found that firms were especially likely to exit 
from the market within a few years of entry. For instance, in Japan, about half of new 
firms exit from the market within five years (Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota, 2005). 
Similarly, in France, about 70 percent of new firms exit within 10 years (Bellone, 
Musso, Nesta, and Quéré, 2005). If both young and old firms have the same probability 
to appear in the survey, the estimated coefficients may be biased without controlling for 
firm age. We thus estimated the baseline model with firm age.
15 Although the 
coefficients differ slightly from those of the baseline model, they maintain the same 
significance levels for productivity. 
We also checked the sensitivity to the truncation level since the threshold level 
of the survey might have affected the results. Using firms with 51 or more workers, we 
reestimated the baseline model.
16  We found that our major findings did not change even 
when we changed the threshold level. These results suggest that our main conclusion is 
not sensitive to the inclusion of firm age and the changes in the threshold level.   
 
4.2.  Discussion 
4.2.1.  Alternative Specification of Baseline Hazard 
One concern is that the results might be sensitive to the specification of baseline 
hazard. To examine this, we estimated an alternative model with the parametric Weibull 
specification in the baseline hazard. The alternative model is described as follows: 
. ln ln ) ln( ) ( ) ( 2 1 0 τ τ β θ β β τ γ β τ τ γ − − + + + − = ′ − + − it it i L t t z t                  ( 1 1 )  
Table 5 indicates the estimation results of the model with the parametric Weibull 
specification of the baseline hazard. Although the scale of coefficients changes slightly, 
all the coefficients maintain the same significance level. Note also that Akaike’s 
Information Criteria (AIC) in Table 5 indicate almost the same values as in Table 4. This 
                                                        
15  Results are presented in Table A4. 
16  Results are presented in Table A5.   11
result implies that the major conclusions do not change even when we change the 
specification of the baseline hazard. 
 
=== Table 5 === 
 
4.2.2.  Productivity Growth and Firm Survival 
Another important question might be the effects of growth on firm survival. If 
the future exiting firms have different growth paths from future survivors, there is an 
important implication for modeling the firm dynamics. We thus include the growth of 
TFP and firm size as independent variables to test the effects of growth on firm survival. 
The regression equation is as follows: 
, ln Eq.(10) ) ( ) ( 3 τ θ β β τ τ γ − Δ + = ′ − + − it i t z t                                ( 1 2 )  
where  τ θ − Δ it ln   is the growth of TFP. 
Table 6 presents the results that examine the effects of level and growth at the 
same time. Three findings stand out in this table. First, TFP is a good indicator in 
predicting the future firm exits even after we control for the growth of productivity and 
scale. Second, TFP growth is also a useful variable for predicting future firm exits. The 
coefficients of the TFP growth also indicate significantly negative signs two years 
before the exit of firms. The result suggests that firms with higher productivity growth 
have different survival probability (and thus different firm dynamics) from firms with 
lower productivity growth. Finally, although unobservable firm heterogeneity has a 
significant effect on the firm survival analysis, the variance is small as was confirmed in 
the baseline model. These results suggest that our main conclusions do not change even 
if we control for the effects of level and growth at the same time, although the 
coefficients (and hazard rates, accordingly) change slightly. We can thus conclude that 
TFP can be a good indicator for predicting the “death” or “exit” of firms. 
 
=== Table 6 === 
 
4.2.3.  Predicted Survivor Function 
One useful way to describe the effects of productivity gaps on firm survival is to 
estimate a survivor function. From equation (7), the discrete-time survivor function 
) (t Si  for  firm i in  year t thus  is:   12
. } ln ) ( ) ( exp{ exp                 
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For predictions, we used parameters that are obtained from the first column in Table 4 
while baseline covariates were set to the hypothetical reference firm in the industry in 
the initial period of 1995 (i.e.,  ) 00 . 1 ln( ln = TFP  and  ) 113 ln( ln = L ). We considered 
the case in which  0 ln = i α . To examine the effects of productivity gaps, we also 
estimated a survivor function where productivity is 10 percent higher than the baseline 
model. 
Figure 2 presents the estimated survivor function. The figure indicates that, after 
seven years, the probability of survival is five percentage points higher for productive 
firms ( ) 10 . 1 ln( ln = TFP ) than for average firms ( ) 00 . 1 ln( ln = TFP ). The results 
suggest that a firm with 10 percent higher productivity than an industry average firm 
has a five percent higher probability of survival than the average firm.   
 
=== Figure 2 === 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper empirically examines the pre-exit performances of firms in greater 
detail. The paper focuses on productivity as firm performance. To examine the “shadow 
of death,” this paper uses firm-level panel data in Japan for 1995–2002. One of the most 
important contributions in this paper is that, to our knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
incorporate unobserved firm heterogeneity in firm survival analysis. 
The major findings are summarized as follows. First, firms do not face “sudden 
death” but there is a “shadow of death.” Future exiting firms have lower performance 
five years before their exit. Second, both productivity and firm size are good indicators 
for predicting the future survival of firms. The future exiting firms are significantly less 
productive and significantly smaller than future survivors. Besides, growth of 
productivity can also be an indicator of future exit. Third, unobserved firm 
heterogeneity has a significant effect on firm survival analysis. However, the effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity were not large enough to reverse the conclusion. 
The last finding has an important implication for the future survival studies that 
utilize firm and plant level data. With the recent developments in firm and plant level 
panel data, a number of studies in industrial organization began to recognize the   13
importance of unobserved firm (or plant) heterogeneity. However, our results suggest 
that, although unobserved heterogeneity exists, the effects are small and do not change 
the conclusions of the firm survival analysis. 
It is also important to note the limitations of our paper. One of the most 
important limitations is that the data do not include firms with less than 50 workers. 
Although the METI database is used in various studies of firm exit, some exits are not 
necessarily the same as the “death” or the “bankruptcy” of the firms. In order to 
examine the “death” of a firm more correctly, it has to be emphasized that the quality 
and the coverage of the firm-level data must be improved and expanded, which is an 
unspectacular but important subject for the government. 
 
Technical Appendix 1. Derivation of Equations (3) and (5) 
The connection between continuous- and discrete-time duration models is 
derived by Lunde, Timmermann, and Blake (1999), which is summarized as follows. 
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From equation (A1), we thus have equation (3): 
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Technical Appendix 2. Construction of Multilateral TFP index 
Output 
There are two ways to define output: gross output and net output, or value-added. 
It is clear that a production function based on gross output is a less restrictive 
formulation of inputs. Moreover, studies based on micro-level data favor gross rather 
than value-added output because the double counting of intermediate outputs does not 
become a severe problem at the micro level where there are few intraindustry 
transactions.
17  This study thus used gross output. 
Gross output is defined as: (sales – operating cost + personnel cost + 
depreciation cost) / output price index. Output price index was from the Statistics of 
National Accounting (SNA) output price deflator obtained from the Economic and 




Inputs consisted of labor, capital, and intermediate input. Labor was defined as 
man-hours. Working hour data were from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
(2005).
19 Capital stock was estimated from tangible assets, following Nishimura, 
Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005). Intermediate input was defined as: (operating cost – 
personnel cost – depreciation cost) / input price index.
20 The input price index was the 
                                                        
17  At the macro level, where the outputs of an industry can be used as inputs by another industry in 
assembling final goods, value-added measure is preferred because value added nets out the 
transactions of intermediate outputs. For more detail on this issue, see McGuckin and Nguyen 
(1993). 
18  Gross Domestic Product and Factor Income Classified by Economic Activities (Deflators on 
Outputs) <http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/h17-nenpou/n90fcs2d_en.xls> 
19  Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2005) Table 127 Average monthly working days and 
actual working hours by industry and size. 
20  Operating cost = cost of sales + selling and general administrative expenses.   15




Labor cost was defined as total wage payments. Capital cost is defined as real 
capital stock  it K  times user cost  Kit p . Following Kiyota and Okazaki (2005), we 
































where  It p  is the investment goods deflator obtained from Toyo Keizai (2005);  t τ  is 
the corporate tax rate on business income from the Ministry of Finance website;
22  t r  is 
the interest rate that is defined as a 10-year bond yield (annual average) obtained from 
Toyo Keizai (2005);  it δ  is depreciation rate and from the KEO Data Base;
23  i φ  is 
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The second equation means that the end point of the depreciation period is defined as 
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Sources:  1) Tokyo Shoko Research, Ltd.
2) Recof (2003)
Note: The number of bankruptcies indicates the number of
         bankruptcies of enterprises with liabilities of at least 100 million yen.Figure 1. Number of Bankruptcies and M&As in Japan, 1990-2002
Sources: 1) TSR (various years).
              2) RECOF(2003).
Figure 2. Predicted Survivor Functions: Difference of Productivity
Predicted survival rate at t.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 t = 7
TFP = 1.00 0.83 0.73 0.65 0.59 0.53 0.48 0.42

























































M&AsTable 1. Exit of "New" Firms, by Entry Year Cohort Table 2.  Transition Matrix between Manufacturing and Wholesale/retail Trade
Entry year year t-1 (number of firms) year t-1 (%)





1995 2,105 2,105 1995-96 Manufacturing 913 22 97.0 2.6
1996 1,782 988 2,770 Wholesale/retail trade 28 819 3.0 97.4
1997 1,605 812 991 3,408 Total 941 841 100.0 100.0
1998 1,452 699 811 895 3,857 1996-97 Manufacturing 1,256 27 97.3 2.4
1999 1,330 627 695 747 771 4,170 Wholesale/retail trade 35 1,099 2.7 97.6
2000 1,210 563 600 658 591 903 4,525 Total 1,291 1,126 100.0 100.0
2001 1,104 498 520 564 503 706 985 4,880 1997-98 Manufacturing 1,541 28 98.2 2.0
2002 1,000 448 453 485 425 588 751 798 4,948 Wholesale/retail trade 28 1,365 1.8 98.0
Conditional survival rate (previous year = 100) Total 1,569 1,393 100.0 100.0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 1998-99 Manufacturing 1,789 22 98.0 1.4
1995 Wholesale/retail trade 37 1,551 2.0 98.6
1996 84.7 Total 1,826 1,573 100.0 100.0
1997 90.1 82.2 1999-00 Manufacturing 1,852 50 97.8 2.9
1998 90.5 86.1 81.8 Wholesale/retail trade 41 1,679 2.2 97.1
1999 91.6 89.7 85.7 83.5 Total 1,893 1,729 100.0 100.0
2000 91.0 89.8 86.3 88.1 76.7 2000-01 Manufacturing 2,047 40 99.1 2.2
2001 91.2 88.5 86.7 85.7 85.1 78.2 Wholesale/retail trade 18 1,790 0.9 97.8
2002 90.6 90.0 87.1 86.0 84.5 83.3 76.2 Total 2,065 1,830 100.0 100.0
Unconditional survival rate (entry year = 100) 2001-02 Manufacturing 2,202 23 98.5 1.2
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total Wholesale/retail trade 33 1,892 1.5 98.8
1995 100.0 Total 2,235 1,915 100.0 100.0
1996 84.7 100.0 1995-02 Manufacturing 11,600 212 98.1 2.0
1997 76.2 82.2 100.0 Wholesale/retail trade 220 10,195 1.9 98.0
1998 69.0 70.7 81.8 100.0 Total 11,820 10,407 100.0 100.0
1999 63.2 63.5 70.1 83.5 100.0 Source: The METI database.
2000 57.5 57.0 60.5 73.5 76.7 100.0
2001 52.4 50.4 52.5 63.0 65.2 78.2 100.0
2002 47.5 45.3 45.7 54.2 55.1 65.1 76.2 100.0
Source: The METI database.Table 3.  "Shadow of Death" Effects without Unobserved Heterogeneity
τ=1 τ=2 τ=3 τ=4 τ=5 τ=6
ln TFPt-τ -1.316*** -1.231*** -0.636** -0.635* -0.782* -0.352
[0.137] [0.193] [0.272] [0.340] [0.421] [0.604]
ln Lt-τ -0.445*** -0.456*** -0.430*** -0.365*** -0.405*** -0.339***
[0.028] [0.036] [0.044] [0.053] [0.070] [0.095]
Hazard rate
TFP 0.268 0.292 0.529 0.530 0.457 0.703
L 0.641 0.634 0.651 0.694 0.667 0.713
N 25,715 18,077 12,628 8,468 5,225 2,812
No. of obsevations -9,886.1 -6,269.4 -4,228.1 -2,745.4 -1,653.7 -859.2
AIC 0.770 0.695 0.671 0.650 0.635 0.614
Notes:
2) AIC: Akaike's Information Criteria.
Source: The METI database.
Table 4.  "Shadow of Death" Effects with Unobserved Heterogeneity
τ=1 τ=2 τ=3 τ=4 τ=5 τ=6
ln TFPt-τ -1.316*** -1.231*** -0.636** -0.634* -0.824* -0.352
[0.350] [0.193] [0.272] [0.340] [0.497] [0.604]
ln Lt-τ -0.445 -0.456*** -0.430*** -0.365*** -0.425*** -0.339***
[0.521] [0.036] [0.044] [0.053] [0.125] [0.096]
ln σ
2 -11.520*** -9.968*** -9.817*** -11.551*** -0.774 -11.433
[3.011] [0.266] [0.596] [3.875] [5.217] [21.011]
σ
2 0.00001 0.00005 0.00005 0.00001 0.46106 0.00001
Hazard rate
TFP 0.268 0.292 0.529 0.530 0.439 0.703
L 0.641 0.634 0.651 0.694 0.654 0.712
No. of obsevations 25,715 18,077 12,628 8,468 5,225 2,812
Log-likelihood -9,886.1 -6,269.4 -4,228.1 -2,745.4 -1,653.7 -859.2
AIC 0.770 0.695 0.671 0.650 0.635 0.615
Notes: 1) σ
2 is obtained from the estimated coefficient of ln σ
2: exp(ln σ
2).
2) For other notes and source, see Table 3.
1) ***, **, and  * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors.Table 5.  "Shadow of Death" Effects: Alternative Duration Dependence
τ=1 τ=2 τ=3 τ=4 τ=5 τ=6
ln TFPt-τ -1.316*** -1.229*** -0.631** -0.637* -0.810* -0.353
[0.137] [0.193] [0.272] [0.339] [0.492] [0.604]
ln Lt-τ -0.444*** -0.457*** -0.430*** -0.365*** -0.415*** -0.339***
[0.028] [0.036] [0.044] [0.053] [0.126] [0.095]
ln σ
2 -13.155 -9.866*** -10.704*** -10.519*** -1.531 -9.927***
[10.865] [0.183] [1.386] [1.860] [11.384] [1.027]
σ
2 0.00000 0.00005 0.00002 0.00003 0.21639 0.00005
Hazard rate
TFP 0.268 0.293 0.532 0.529 0.445 0.703
L 0.641 0.633 0.651 0.694 0.660 0.712
No. of obsevations 25,715 18,077 12,628 8,468 5,225 2,812
Log-likelihood -9,891.8 -6,269.9 -4,228.6 -2,745.8 -1,654.0 -859.2
AIC 0.770 0.694 0.671 0.650 0.635 0.615
For notes and source, see Table 3.
Table 6.  "Shadow of Death" Effects: Level and Growth
τ=1 τ=2 τ=3 τ=4
ln TFPt-τ -1.411*** -1.109*** -0.878** -0.884
[0.206] [0.276] [0.370] [0.576]
ln Lt-τ -0.458*** -0.433*** -0.365*** -0.424***
[0.037] [0.045] [0.053] [0.129]
TFP growth t-τ, t-τ-1 -0.649** -1.847*** -0.813 -0.147
[0.307] [0.404] [0.547] [0.681]
ln σ
2 -9.486*** -11.937 -10.960*** -0.829
[0.171] [8.197] [2.326] [5.861]
σ
2 0.00008 0.00001 0.00002 0.43658
Hazard rate
TFP 0.244 0.330 0.416 0.413
L 0.633 0.649 0.694 0.654
TFP growth 0.523 0.158 0.444 0.863
No. of obsevations 18,077 12,628 8,468 5,225
Log-likelihood -6,267.1 -4,218.0 -2,744.2 -1,653.7
AIC 0.694 0.669 0.650 0.636
For notes and source, see Table 3.Table A1. Number of Firms and Exits, by Industry
Number of firms Number of exits














Food products 149 191 244 270 305 315 347 351 17 24 28 16 29 29 38
Textile products 2 2 2 3 2 8 3 0 3 0 2 6 2 7 2 7 7375725
Wearing-apparel and other ready-made
textile products 44 51 61 52 53 56 55 54 11 10 18 10 11 9 7
Timber and wooden products 1 6 2 0 3 1 3 2 3 4 3 6 3 7 3 2 5174258
Furniture and fixtures 1 8 2 2 2 9 3 1 2 9 3 4 3 0 2 7 336346 1 0
Pulp and paper 3 3 4 3 4 7 6 2 7 1 8 3 7 1 7 1 66327 1 4 1 2
Publishing and printing 71 85 113 154 158 172 190 197 7 8 6 22 23 21 21
Leather tanning and leather products 55373655 0204121
Rubber products 1 2 1 7 2 1 1 9 1 9 2 2 2 7 2 9 0012213
Chemical products 4 9 7 0 7 6 9 5 1 1 0 1 1 8 1 3 5 1 4 3 4955 1 47 1 5
Petroleum and coal products 62 86 113 115 124 136 144 155 7 8 15 12 12 23 16
Ceramic, stone and clay products 52 77 84 97 91 95 105 91 7 12 10 15 13 13 20
Iron and steel 2 5 2 8 4 3 5 0 4 7 5 4 6 6 7 0 4258652
Non-ferrous metals 1 9 3 1 2 8 3 5 4 0 4 6 5 4 4 7 0223459
Fabricated metal products 77 110 127 155 165 175 183 184 8 13 19 15 25 27 26
General machinery 111 147 206 227 259 275 301 307 19 15 25 25 38 38 35
Electrical machinery 170 225 285 321 346 402 436 464 29 21 29 25 44 58 56
Transportation machinery 99 126 145 161 171 173 197 223 18 8 17 19 22 13 23
Precision machinery 3 5 4 4 4 9 5 7 6 3 7 3 7 8 1 0 0 4334695
Other manufacturing 4 1 5 0 5 0 5 8 5 3 6 5 6 7 6 7 1 3 1 0838 1 08
Wholesale trade 628 821 1,024 1,123 1,234 1,295 1,341 1,330 100 114 158 141 166 220 233
Retail trade 367 498 601 706 765 868 984 974 54 79 74 115 104 113 177
Total 2,105 2,770 3,408 3,857 4,170 4,525 4,880 4,948 323 353 446 458 548 630 730
Source: The METI database.Table A2. Summary Statistics
Level Growth
Mean Mean
N ln TFP ln L N TFP
1995 2,105 -0.059 4.725
1996 2,770 -0.050 4.749 1,782 0.010
1997 3,408 -0.052 4.776 2,417 0.001
1998 3,857 -0.064 4.779 2,962 -0.012
1999 4,170 -0.044 4.801 3,399 0.018
2000 4,525 -0.019 4.827 3,622 0.023
2001 4,880 -0.029 4.844 3,895 -0.011
Standard error Standard error
ln TFP ln L TFP
1995 0.106 0.765
1996 0.110 0.758 0.077
1997 0.098 0.772 0.078
1998 0.106 0.769 0.067
1999 0.104 0.772 0.068
2000 0.105 0.783 0.071
2001 0.107 0.797 0.076
Source: The METI database.
Table A3. Correlation Matrix
N=25,715 ln TFP ln L D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 N = 18,077 ln TFP ln L TFP Growth
ln TFP 1.000 ln TFP 1.000
ln L -0.003 1.000 ln L -0.004 1.000
D1 -0.065 -0.059 1.000 TFP Growth 0.338 -0.008 1.000
D2 -0.009 -0.020 -0.337 1.000
D3 0.010 0.003 -0.286 -0.228 1.000
D4 -0.001 0.023 -0.247 -0.197 -0.167 1.000
D5 0.027 0.034 -0.209 -0.167 -0.141 -0.122 1.000
D6 0.065 0.039 -0.173 -0.138 -0.117 -0.101 -0.086 1.000
D7 0.030 0.033 -0.138 -0.110 -0.093 -0.081 -0.068 -0.057 1.000
Source: The METI database.Table A4.  "Shadow of Death" Effects for Firms with Year of Establishment
τ=1 τ=2 τ=3 τ=4 τ=5 τ=6
ln TFPt-τ -1.338*** -1.282*** -0.690** -0.672** -0.854* -0.378
[0.137] [0.191] [0.269] [0.335] [0.499] [0.609]
ln Lt-τ -0.449*** -0.464*** -0.435*** -0.367*** -0.430*** -0.333***
[0.028] [0.036] [0.044] [0.054] [0.126] [0.105]
AGEt-τ -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004 -0.005
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
ln σ
2 -10.635 -8.045*** -5.587*** -8.311 -0.479 -8.673***
[63.572] [0.152] [0.263] [89.091] [3.872] [0.521]
σ
2 0.00002 0.00032 0.00374 0.00025 0.61931 0.00017
Hazard rate
TFP 0.262 0.277 0.502 0.511 0.426 0.685
L 0.638 0.629 0.647 0.693 0.651 0.717
AGE 0.997 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.996 0.995
No. of obsevations 25,715 18,077 12,628 8,468 5,225 2,812
Log-likelihood -9,882.6 -6,260.6 -4,222.3 -2,741.0 -1,652.7 -858.5
AIC 0.769 0.694 0.670 0.649 0.635 0.615
For notes and source, see Table 3.
Table A5.  "Shadow of Death" Effects: Alternative Threshold Level
τ=1 τ=2 τ=3 τ=4 τ=5 τ=6
ln TFPt-τ -1.326*** -1.366*** -0.645** -0.605* -0.765* -0.498
[0.172] [0.263] [0.278] [0.349] [0.433] [0.605]
ln Lt-τ -0.387*** -0.409*** -0.347*** -0.297*** -0.346*** -0.299***
[0.033] [0.052] [0.044] [0.054] [0.070] [0.095]
ln σ
2 -2.722 -0.866 -11.467*** -12.068*** -8.429*** -10.059***
[3.686] [1.252] [0.795] [0.572] [0.484] [2.948]
σ
2 0.06571 0.42073 0.00001 0.00001 0.00022 0.00004
Hazard rate
TFP 0.266 0.255 0.525 0.546 0.465 0.608
L 0.679 0.664 0.707 0.743 0.708 0.742
No. of obsevations 25,165 17,677 12,350 8,290 5,119 2,757
Log-likelihood -9,471.3 -5,960.0 -4,008.5 -2,613.2 -1,575.3 -827.9
AIC 0.754 0.675 0.650 0.632 0.618 0.604
For notes and source, see Table 3.